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Richard A. Lobdell 
A B S T R A C T 
The extent of the food crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa is generating a 
renewed interest in the role of peasants in addressing the food problem 
This paper is premised on the view that policy action with respect to 
agriculture1 development in Africa requires a realistic model of how 
rural peasants make decisions. In the first part of the paper we 
construct a model of such decision-making. The model focuses on 
peasant-type households as described and analysed by Chayanov. A cen-
tral characteristic of such households is their attempt to seek a 
total of satisfactions, as producing and consuming units, rather 
than the pursuit of profit maximisation inherent in many micro-
economic models of rural households. In the attempt to achieve its 
objectives, the household must make decisions concerning the allocation 
of its principal productive resource, labour. The model outlines the 
manner in which labour allocation decisions are made, subject to 
plausible constraints operating on rural households in Africa. The 
second part of the paper examines some of the implications of this 
model for various rural development policies. 
1, INTRODUCTION 
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa face a growing food 
crisis. World Bank staff have documented a growing dependence on 
imported cereal grains, from 7.7 kgs. per capita in 1961-63 to 
32.7 kgs per capita in 1980-82 (Cleaver, 1984: Table 9). The United 
States' Department of Agriculture estimates Africa's food imports 
will need to increase by a multiple of two or three times during 
the 1980's merely to close the gap between food productivity and 
population size (North-South Institute, 1983: p. 2), 
As part of the current food crisis there seems to be eta*r-
ging a growing recognition that Africa's hope for the future rests 
on its many rural peasants. Where large state and private farms 
can take some credit for successes in the area of export crops, 
they cannot hope to produce the food needed, That task will need 
to fall largely on small-holder agriculture. 
This belated acceptance of the African peasants is a 
product of neoessity, but it reflects also a recent recognition 
that peasants are not as fatalistic, irrational and backward as 
once believed**. Past attempts to impose development from above 
were premised on the view that peasants were a problem that had to 
be overcome. A good example, within the liberal, capitalist tradi-
tion, is the Swynnerton plan (Swnnerton, 1954), in Kenya in the 
mid-1950's, which attempted to transform peasants into yeoman, 
capitalist farmers. An alternative example, drawing on the conclu-
sions of Marx and Lenin, argues African peasants are a produot of 
colonialism, and they have to be "captured", if development is to 
succeed (Hyden, 1980). 
In contrast, some contemporary literature is beginning to 
present a more positive view of peasants. They are not seen to be 
rational in the narrow economic sense of T.W, Schultz's Transforming 
Traditional Agriculture, nor is the We stern view of .man seen to be 
applicable. Rather, within the social and economic environment in 
whioh they live, they are seen to be making rational responses 
* * 
For a critical summary of the earlier views on peasants see 
Douglass (1970). 
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(e.g., Lipton, 1968; Moillossoux, 1972; Shanin, 1973; Deere ond 
do Jonvry, 1979; Lohnann, 1982). Their technology is simple, by 
Westorn standards, but is seen as ingenious within its environment 
(Nash, 1967: 4). Given the cyclical pattern of rainfall that 
dominates their lives, they tend to have a circular rather than a 
linear view of time (Shanin, 1971: 247). They are now recognised 
to have couplex farming systems (Heyer, 1971: 55; Hunt, 1978: 64; 
Gerrard, 1983.: 28). The success of agricultural projects is seen 
to depend 011 the willingness of planners ond extension workers to 
understand the objectives ond constraints under which peasant 
formers operate (Hunt, 1979: 278). 
The purpose of this paper is to build 011 this contemporary 
literature and to formulate a nodel of household decision-making 
with reference to the allocation of labour within a peasant-type 
household. Where the primary focus will be on social relations 
internal to the household, the social relations external to the 
household, reflecting the setting within which peasants must 
operate, will be discussed as well. The intent is to construct a 
model which is historically specific to contemporary Africa. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of this model for 
various rural development policies. 
The model lias its roots in the peasant-type rural house-
holds described and analysed'by Chayanov (1966),This peasant-
type decision-making unit has several unique features. First, it 
is a household economy, in contrast to an individual-based econony 
or some larger collective such as a village or extended group of 
households. This is not to say that individual household members 
do not strongly influence the decision-making process, or that 
outside forces are unimportant in the decisions taken. Rather, 
the model views decisions as being taken within the household in 
light of its collective needs, subject to 0 more or less pervasive 
social environment. 
Second, the model is premised on the rural- household 
serving as a unit of production while seeking to sustain itself as 
a consuming unit; it is both a unit of reproduction and a unit of 
„ - » . . 
For extensions and critiques of this model see: Shanin (1973); 
Harrison (1977); Deere and de Janvry (1979); Hunt (1979); Lehmann 
(1982); and Brignol and Crispi (1982). 
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production. According to Nash, in peasant societies"..... there 
are no durable social units based solely on production activities." 
(Nash, 1966: 23). Such a household unit has an objective function 
somewhat more complex than merely seeking to maximise profits. 
Since the vast majority of rural households in Africa appear to 
be more akin to 'peasants' than to 'commercial enterpreneurs', the 
model is appropriate for designing and evaluating rural development 
strategies. 
Third, again following Chayanov, the model maintains that 
family labour "employed" by the household cannot be evaluated in 
economic terms. Rather, it is measured in terms of labour effort 
(self-exploitation) of the household members. In the present paper, 
it is assumed that non-family labour is not employed, in a conven-
tional sense, by the household. Where such employment does occur, 
"..... it must be so clothed in ceremonial and ritual that selling 
labour power does not appear either to the buyer or the seller as 
a naked economic transaction." (Nash, 1966: 24) . One implication 
of this view towards labour is that other inputs, such as capital 
and land, are valued by the peasant-type household at prices 
very different than would be the case for a typical profit-
maximising enterprise* 
Finally, the use of peasant-type household as the decision-
making unit avoids having to distinguish between those who produce 
for a market and those who produce for their own immediate consump-
tion. This is helpful because it is not generally the case that 
the disposition of output will, per se, influence the process by 
whioh decisions are taken. 
II THE MODEL 
For the purposes of the model, the definition of household 
is similar to Shanin's definition of family (Shanin, 1971: 242 -
243). It is a "production team" with a 'hard core" which consists 
of a "married couple or polygamous group and their offspring." On 
the consumption side, it is defined by "the People who eat from 
the same pot*" One's position within the household determines 
¥ This point, for land in a peasant farm economy, is made by Chayanov 
as quoted in Wolf (1966: 15). 
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duties, fmotions and rights. All members have consumption rights 
which correspond "to the peasant customary understanding of property 
rights. Even though land, cattle and equipment may be formally 
defined as belonging to a man who heads a household, in actual fact 
he acts rather as a holder and manager of the common family property 
with the right to sell or give it away heavily restricted.,," 
(Shanin, 1973: 68), Given the priority of assuring subsistence, 
a .hierarchical structure has evolved which serves to control the 
means of household reproduction: women, the food sujply needed 
between harvests, and seeds (Meillassoux, 1972: 93), The house-
hold, as a basic unit in peasant society, defines "the pattern of 
peasants' everyday actions, interrelationships and values." 
(Shanin, 1971: 243), 
Such households are faced with a set of fundamental deci-
sions, some of which affect immediately the household's economic 
welfare. Among these are decisions concerning the household's 
perception of acceptable living • standards, the preferred alloca-
tion of productive resources and the division of income between 
consumptioxi and saving. Other decisions hold implications for the 
long-term economic welfare of the household and include such 
matters as the level and composition - of investment in physical 
and human capital, the adoption and adaptation of new production 
techniques, the assimilation of new consumption patterns and the 
desired size of the household itself. 
Although useful as a heuristic device, the distinction 
between short-term and long-term decisions is not absolute. Por 
example, the short-term decision with respect to saving clearly 
affects the household welfare in the long-term. Similarly, the 
long-term decisions are taken under short-term conditions and there-
fore must be expected to have an impact on household welfare-... 
in both the short-term and the long-term. Unless noted other-
wise, the current model is concerned with household decision-
making in the short-term. 
It is true that households also make decisions concerning 
matters less obviously economic in nature. Among these are the 
degree to which the household is integrated socially with the 
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local community, the nature of religious affiliation, political 
allegiance and the like. Without for a .moment denying that such 
decisions may have important implications for the household's 
economic welfare, the model focuses on the manner in which economic 
decisions, especially the labour allocation decision, are made by 
peasant-type households. 
Household Objectives 
Household behaviour and objectives are inextricably linked 
to the size and demographic composition of the household. Both 
change over time as individuals age and as households experience 
births, deaths and migration. During some relatively short time 
period, however, the size and demographic composition of the house-
hold may be viewed as fixed. Thus, given the exact age composition 
of the household, the size of the household may be expressed as 
(A), the number of adult-equivalent members of the household. 
In the short-term the household may be said to possess 
a complex set of tastes, aspirations and perceptions of socially 
acceptable behaviour which, in combination with household size, 
largely determine the household's objectives. Without implying 
any rank order of relative importance, v,e distinguish three broad 
Categories of household objectives. 
One set of objectives concerns the household's perception 
of a material standard of living below which it will feel deprived, 
denoted here by (c), the minimum socially acceptable level of 
consumption per adult-equivalent member 01 the household. This 
will certainly include adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs (Hunt, 
1978: 67).* It also includes adequate shelter and clothing and 
any services judged by the household to be essential (possible 
examples are education ond health services). More generally, (0) 
is a vector of goods ond services identified by the household in 
relationship'to its peers; thus (c) will vary considerably from 
place to place and from time to time. Since (c) is largely 
socially determined, it bears a strong resemblance to David 
_ 1. " 
* 
See also, Wolf's Concept of "minimum caloric rations," Wolf 
(1966: 5 - 10). 
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Ricardo's "natural price of labour"* and John S. Mill's "scale 
or standard of comfort.** 
Household objectives also include the .maintenance of a 
set of social relationships. That is, the household is obliged 
to acquire real resources (e.g., time, goods, money) with which 
to service social relationships connected with reciprocal exchange, 
feast day celebrations and ceremonial events associated with births, 
marriage,-; and deaths. The exchange may be resources, such as a 
gift of land provided by the chief, cattle given as bride wealth, 
or an exchange of labour, or in the form of material aid intended 
to assure a guaranteed minimal subsistence for a household in need 
(Dalton, 1967: 71 - 74). Wolf (1966: 5 - 10) describes this 
objectives an the need to provide for a "ceremonial fund." It is 
here denoted by (R), the minimum expenditure on social relation-
ships per adult-equivalent member of the household. 
Finally, the household's objectives include provision for 
a target level of surplus, (s), to be used for a variety of p«r» 
poses.*** The household almost certainly views the future with 
apprehension: crops may fail or be destroyed, wage inco.me may 
disappear, or real income may be eroded by unanticipated inflation. 
Consequently (s) represents in part a cushion against misfortune 
and error. In addition, the household may wish to increase.consump-
tion or ceremonial expenditures beyond that judged to be the socially 
"It is not to be understood that the natural price of labour, 
estimated in food and necessaries, is absolutely fixed and constant. 
It varies at different times in the same country, and very materially 
differs in different countries. It essentially depends on the habits 
and customs of the people." David Ricardo, The Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1963), p. 47. 
•X--X-
John S, Mill's socially defined concept of subsistence appears 
in both his discussion "Of Wages" (Book Two, II) and "Of the 
Stationary State" (Book Four, i) in his Principles of Political 
Economy (London (: Longmans, Green and Co. , 1909).. 
* * * 
Where S includes some saving, it should not be seen as surplus 
value. Kerblay (1971: 1 50, footnote 1) argues all income is 
viewed by peasants as a product of labour. Hence, they do not 
have a concept of surplus value nor do they recognise interest 
as a return to capital. 
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acceptable minimum? if so, (s) represents the means by which 
to pursue that objective. Third, peasant households likely derive 
positive utility from holding and displaying certain-forms of 
wealth. The nature of one's house, female jewellery, and a large 
herd- of livestock would be common expressions of wealth. The 
household may also wish to accumulate saving for investment in land, 
physical capital or the education of its members; hence, (s) Y/ould 
represent a fund for investment as well as for the "replacement" 
of product resources, as identified by Wolf (1966: 5 - 10). For 
any given household any or all of tlletee motivations may lie 
behind the objectives gf pursuing 9 target level of surplus, (s). 
The concept of household surplus raises several issues. 
First, are there limit? to the amount of surplus a household may 
accumulate? Effectively, yes. The primary reason is-the observed 
relatively low incomes of peasant households combined with the 
extent of surplus extraction from such households (Shanin, 1973: 
71; Deere and de Janvry, 1979: 607 and 610). Another reason is 
the pervasive effect, of various leveling mechanisms in-peasant 
communities. We have noted already one such mechanism, the need 
to maintain social relationshipr* Others mentioned are the limited 
availability and high cost of credit, (Shanin, 1973: 71) the 
fragmentation of land holdings via inheritance, (Shanin, 1974; 
193) and the extent of resources spent on land disputes (Hunt, 
1978: 77). Doyle (1974: 64) also argues the limited bundle of 
consumer goods accessible to peasants in- some localities dampens 
their consumption horizons. This is especially evident for 
pastoralists, as their nomadic way of life necessitates a mobile 
form of wealth, e.g., livestock (Livingstone, 19773 222 - 223), 
A second issue is whether there can be significant 
differences in the extent of surplus accumulation among peasant 
households within a community, Dal ton argues differences in 
holdings of wealth occurred within traditional societies; such 
dif ferences were defined by differences in social status of the 
various households involved (Dalton 1967: 77). The effect of 
Western consumerism on traditional societies has been to "democratize" 
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wealth, destroying some of the social relationships inherent to 
traditional social systems. Both Lehmann (1982) and Bernstein 
(1979) argue that social differentiations exist within communities 
and such differences can be compatible with the continued functioning 
of peasant units of production. Hunt (1979: 271) provides evidence 
of this for Mbere, Kenya, citing the experience of those households 
which had invested in education for some members, who subsequently 
were ablo to obtain formal sector employment. Deere and de Janvry 
(1979: 610) question whether accumulation is part-of the objective 
function of peasants. If it is, they claim it is sufficiently- con-
strained to prevent internal differentiation, within communities, 
into social classes. Such constraints may v/ell reflect the peasant 
value set, where economic goals are not ends in themselves; economic 
activity derives its meaning from the general values of society 
(Nash, 1967: 8 - 9 ) . 
Summarising the above discussion, the household's objectives 
include the achievement of some minimum standard of .material con-
sumption, the .maintenance of valued social relationships and the. 
acquisition of a fund of surplus. In the short-term, during which 
the household's size, tastes, aspirations and social perceptions are 
all constant and during which prices are known and constant for all 
goods and services contained in (c), (R) and (s), these objectives 
may be seen as manifesting themselves in the.desired level of house-
hold income, (Y). That is, 
* 
(1 ) Y = (C + R) A + S 
where: • - • 
C is the minimum socially acceptable level of consumption per 
adult-equivalent member; 
R is the .minimum expenditure on the maintenance of social 
relationships per adult-equivalent member; 
A is the number of adult-equivalent members; and 
S is the desired level of surplus. 
It will be noted that leisure has not been included in the 
objectives of the household. There are two reasons for not doing so. 
First, in peasant-type households the typical trade-off is between 
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types of work or between more or less work effort rather than 
between work and leisure per se (G-wyer, 197l). Second, in a 
society where significant amounts of .time and effort are invested 
in the maintenance of social relationships, the distinction between 
work and leisure becomes difficult to identify (Doyle, 1974: 63 - 64). 
/ilthough we do not deny that "pure" leisure may be an objective 
of peasant-type households, we consider it to be much less important 
than the other objectives discussed. 
It might be considered relevant to specify this objective 
function in terms of expected life-time earnings. Such a specifica-
tion v/ould have the advantage of providing a specific present value 
to a major element of (s). But, as reported by Button (1973: 85) 
for Uganda, virtually all.men interviewed expected their security in 
old age to come from the land they would purchase or the children 
they vrould educate with the employment income they hoped to earn. 
Depending on whether local inheritance practices assure that elderly 
parents will be provided for by their children, current expenditures 
on (R) may be necessary as a means of .socialising children to accept 
later responsibility for the care of aged parents. Therefore, the 
dominant concern of the household is the current time period and 
A 
the allocation of labour to attain (Y), even though longer-term 
interests may have some impact on how labour is actually allocated. 
Over time the values of (c), (R), and (s) may be expected 
to change. As indicated above, household preferences and perceptions 
of acceptable behaviour are shaped by the social, political and 
economic environment within v/hich the household functions. Public 
officials, with the example they set, the ideology they promote, 
the industries they encourage and the policies they implement will surely 
exercise a pov/erful influence on individual households. In addition, 
the future values of (c) and (s) (and possibly, (R) may be affected 
by current household decisions. Por example, a household which plans 
to dispatch certain of v its members to. an urban area is likely to 
perceive a need • for schooling these individuals. This decision 
will affect the composition, and possibly the Values, of (c) and (s). 
Both the experience of schooling and residency in town are likely to 
have a positive feedback on (c) (Hunt, 1979: 267). Similarly, 
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changing perceptions of risk or revisions in investment plans will 
affect the desired level of surplus, (s), Finally, the expansion 
of markets and variation in prices will affect both the composition 
and values of (c), (R) and (s) (Doyle, 1974 -68). 
Determinants ox Household Income 
To achieve its objectives the household must acquire 
income from its productive activities. Assuming these activities 
and their output can be assigned prices, . income may be accounted 
in monetary terms even though some is in fact received in kind. 
The household's immediate concern is with net income: gross receipts 
less costs associated with the acquisition of th»se receipts. 
Prominent among these costs are taxes, rents, depreciation, 
amortization of debt and the purchase of inputs such as fuel, 
fertilizer, insecticides and improved seeds. 
There are two reasons for the exclusion of labour as a 
cost of acquiring income. First, the peasant-type households 
considered here do not as a rule 'employ wage labour.* Second, 
following Chayanov's description of the European peasantries, 
household labour is not a "cost" of production. To be sure, 
household labour does involve effort — even drudgery — and a 
sacrifice of time which might have been devoted to so.me alternative 
use. In this sense, household labour is not "free". But, the house-
hold does not view the use of its labour as an accountable cost of 
production. Indeed it is this attitude which principally distingui-
shes peasant-type households from commercial enterprises. 
In the short-term during which it is difficult to alter 
the use of non-labour resources, net inco.me earned from any one 
activity is simply the amount of household labour involved in that 
activity times the average net return to labour from that activity. 
A1though the amount of labour available to the household is a 
function of its size and age composition, these factors may be 
considered fixed in the short-term and the total amount of labour 
¥ 
The reasons why labour is not employed extensively are not well 
understood. Possibly wage employment is' seen as contrary to the 
existing pattern of social relationships. An alternative 
hypothesis, proposed by Hunt (1978: 64 - 65), is the existence of 
a management constraint within peasant households. 
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available is given by (L), the number of adult-equivalent 
labourers in the household. Y/here land is not a constraint, 
labour availability, especially during peak seasons of the 
agricultural cycle, becomes the operational constraint to peasant 
farm production (Heyer, 1971). 
There is much evidence that rural households derive 
income from a variety of activities. Depending on the particular 
circumstances which confront the household under study, the number 
of income sources may be large or small. Por illustrative pur-
poses, we here.define;total net income accruing to the rural 
household (Y) as: 
(2) Y = Ya + Ym + Ye + Yr ~ E Ei i 
And .more generally, 
(3) Y =Z Lj Wj +E8r Lr Wr - £ Ei 
j r i 
where; 
Ya is household income derived from agricultural activity 
undertaken by household members minus the cost of 
inputs obtained to r produce that income; 
Ym is household income derived from rural non-agricultural 
activity undertaken in the local area by household 
members minus the cost of inputs obtained to produce 
that income; 
Ye is income derived from household members employed in 
local activity not organised by the household; 
Yr is the net change in household income caused by the 
emigration of one or more members. Included are net 
remittances received by the household, the net value of 
saving brought to the local area by returning 
members and any reduction in household consumption 
less any change in output caused by the absence of 
.members;* 
E Ei is the sum total of surplus extracted by others from 
the peasant household; 
_ _ _ _ _ . 
Parents may promote emigration because they derive satisfaction 
from seeing a family member enjoy a higher standard of living in 
an urban area even though insignificant remittances are returned. 
This possibility of a psychic return to parental sacrifice is 
recognized but not incorporated explicitly into "the model. 
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j is the set of activities a, n and c; 
ij is the number of adult-equivalent labour units engaged 
in the jth activity; 
¥/j is the average return per adult-equivalent labour 
unit engaged in the j th activity; and 
= Yr/(lr Wr). 
Two issues in this summary statement on sources of income 
require further elaboration: the content of (E). and the role of 
minimising risk. According to lehmann ('1932 j 149), surplus, 
extraction occurs whenever peasant households interact with other 
social classes. Deere and de Janvry (1979: 607 - 608) have enumerated 
seven forms of surplus extractions 1) required unpaid labour on 
landlord's estate to gain use right to some land; 2) rent in kind; 
3) payment of wages below the value of the labour contributed; 4) 
extraction via adverse terms of trade; 5) usury; 6) rent in cosh; 
and 7) taxation. Not all forms of surplus extraction need be present 
in all cases nor are they all of equpl importance in each case. 
But, within the lite^at^re on peasants, th?re is rather broad 
agreement that peasants share the burden of supporting other classes 
or groups in the larger society. 
With reference to risk, the perceived values of ( w ) are of 
paramount importance to the household. Since these values can be 
known only ex poet, decision-making _ex ante is subject to risk. 
Moreover, the degree of risk is- likely to vary from one activity 
to another. 
Consider for example, those activities in which household 
labour is employed by others (sources of (Ye) and(Yr). Any one 
of these activities might be viewed _ex ante as yielding a constant 
average net return equal to the prevailing "wage" which the household 
correctly believes to be independent of its own decisions. In fact 
these net returns depend on supply and demand conditions in the 
appropriate labour markets, regardless of how those markets are 
structured (e.g., competitive, monopsonistic, etc.) Since labour 
markets are usually in flux, risk is attached on the household's 
perception of these average net returns. In general, activities 
located outside the local area (sources of (Yr)) are likely to 
have a greater variance, around an expected net income than is the 
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esse for activities centred in the local area (sources of (Ye)) 
concerning which the household is better informed. Such an 
interpretation of risk is central to much of the recent migration 
literature (e.g., Todaro, 1969: Todaro, 1976; Stark, 1976). 
Average net income from economic activities organised 
by the household (sources of (Ya) and (Ym)) is also subject to 
risk Both output prices and non-labour costs of production are 
crucial in the determination of these (Wj's). . To. the extent that 
expected prices and costs are not realised _ex post, net income will 
be subject to risk. Average net income is also dependent on labour 
productivity which may be changed unexpectedly through the 
exigencies of Weather, pestilence or other "Acts of God". Moreover, 
the household may experience a d'imunution of average productivity, 
and thus declining average net incomes, if additional household 
labour is- employed in particular activities in which other factors 
(e.g.., land) are fixed. 
Por all these reasons, the household's ex ante evaluation 
of net income from different activities is subject to risk and 
uncertainty. Over time the household may be able to increase 
labour productivity and/or diminish risk through judicious 
investment and adaptation of new production techniques."* •'But in 
the short-term, the household can only attempt to guard against 
risk through the careful estimation of the (Wj's) and the use of 
its surplus fund, (s), as a buffer against misadventure. 
*Hunt (1979: 251) summarises the literature on risk aversion by 
peasant households as follows: "(i) the poorer the peasant house-
hold the greater the proportion of resources devoted to minimal 
survival strategies; (ii) priority to subsistence production forms 
the main component of peasant risk averting strategies; (iii) 
peasants respond to relative price changes in the same way as capi-
talist farmers when th'ey produce for the market. Subsistence 
production is not price responsive." 
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The Allocation of Household Labour 
The allocation of household labour is constrained in two 
ways, First, the household cannot allocate more labour than it 
possesses. If some members are exempt from activity for reasons 
of health, age, sex or in order to pursue other valued objectives 
such as schooling, then the household has less than L to allocate. 
That is, 
' (4) L > ( ELj + Z Lr) . 
j * 
The allocation of labour may also be constrained 
institutionally. On the one hand, the household may face insur-
mountable external constraints which proscribe certain activities. 
For example, if the household cannot gain access to land, (Ya) is 
not ah option for the allocation of its labour. Similarly, law, 
social custom or an inability to accumulate capital may preclude 
the household's participation.^ rural trade or handicrafts (Ym). 
On the other hand, the household may hold strong views as to the 
dignity or social acceptability of certain activities. For example, 
a household may simply refuse employment in activities organised 
by others (Ye and Yr). In either case, the relevant (Lj's) are 
arbitrarily zero in equation (4) above. 
Operating within Such constraints, the household attempts 
to acquire a total net income equal to the desired level of house-
hold income as set out in identity (l) above. Symbolically, 
(5) Y = Y =( C + R) A + S 
In the unlikely event that Y > Y, the household faces 
an "embarrassment of riches" and may choose to reduce its work 
effort, to pursue additional consumption or saving, or to make 
additional investment in human or physical capital. If net 
income is less than desired income (Y <Y), then the household 
will be disappointed and will re-assess its labour allocation. 
The latter is .much more likely because: 1) over time Y can be 
expected to increase, particularly in rural communities where 
formal schooling is considered desirable and where contact exists 
v/ith urban areas either through trade or past history of rural-
urban migration; 2) given the degree of uncertainty involved, 
both in African agriculture and in Africa's labour markets, 
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(Y) will vary considerably; and 3) peasants have little control 
over (E), the extent of surplus extracted. 
Por such households a number of strategies may be 
pursued separately or simultaneously. Where land is accessible, 
the preferred approach is to increase the work effort applied to 
land. This might involve a reconsideration of the prior decision to 
exempt members from v/ork and in general to require all household 
labour to work longer. But, there exists some absolute limit to 
the amount of labour which can be generated in the short-term 
without endangering the health and productivity of household members. 
In any event, the amount of extra labour generated from such 
increased "self-exploitation" is likely to be small, and if average 
net returns to labour.are miniscule, then even the fullest possible 
A 
utilisation of household labour need not ensure that (Y = Y). 
In addition to the possibility of a continued (Y <Y), 
African peasant households have experienced an increasing need for 
cash income, both to meet such household needs as school fees and 
to pay the various forms of (E). One means to cash income is to 
grow cash crops. The literature on peasants identifies crop 
selection priorities. Given the strong desire to minimise risk, 
staple foods for household consumption take first priority .(Medani, 
1972: 66; Bernstein, 1979: 425 and 429; Deere and de Janvry, 1979 
606; Hunt, 1979: 279 - 280). Also, where competing demands for 
labour between food staples and cash crops exist, the planting and 
weeding of food crops will be done first (Heyer, 1971: 64 - 65j 
Doyle, 1974: 65). Another crop selection strategy designed to 
reduce risk is to grow a Cash crop which has 'use value' for the 
household. This provides the household with the opportunity to 
consume the cash crop should its staple food crops fail or should 
the market price for cash crops decline significantly. Finally, 
inter-cropping, rather than growing pure stands of any one crop, 
can serve to reduce the likelihood of total crop failure. 
In general, subject to the above mentioned constraint of 
minimising risk, African peasants are seen to be responsive to 
relative prices among cash crops and to changes in crop prices 
(Medani, 1972: Doyle, 1974: 62; Hunt, 1979: 251). It is the 
larger, wealthier peasant farmers, who have the ability to bear 
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some risk, who can experiment with new crops and new technology, 
and who can grow pure stands of those cash crops with little or 
no 'use value', provided the price is right. 
An alternative means to additional income and/or cash income 
is to pursue non-agricultural self-employment or wage employment. 
Whereas previously the household might have tolerated an "uneconomic" 
situation in which, for example,, (Wa < Win), the household must now 
consider shifting some labour o t oi agriculture (Wa) into noa-
agric 1 tural activities (Wm or We) Even though both total net 
income and ash income wo aid imrease as a result, such a re-
allocation would iir-olve some cost, even if only in the form of 
overcoming inertia and past practice. And, of course, the house-
hold' s ability to shift labour may be severely limited by non-
labour resources at its disposal or by some institutional constraint 
on the use of its. labour. 
Where some form of wage employment is now oommon practice 
in .many peasant households in Africa, less is known about which 
households are the most likely to seek wage employment. A Latin 
American case study shows the majority of the landless (share-
croppers) and small plot holders had at least one labour market 
participant (Deere and de Janvry, 1979: 60.5 - 606). For larger 
peasant farmers, only one-third had a household member engaged in 
wage employment. For the former, eighty per cent of gross income 
was derived from rage employment or from Cash crops, even though 
they devoted a smaller portion of their land to cash crops than 
was the case for the larger farms. The px"opensity to seek wage 
employment increases whenever adverse conditions, such as droughts, 
strike agriculture. This is why we observe in contemporary Africa 
what Chayanov observed in the Soviet Union during the 1920'ss wages 
decline as grain prices increase*. 
A third possible strategy for peasant households involves 
reconsideration of previously held objections to pai-tioular types 
of economic activity. Suppose.for example that a particular house-
— 1 " • • " • • • * • 
According to Hunt (1978:78), this was less evident in Mbere, Kenya 
than Chayanov v/ould suggest because peasants in an adverse agricultural 
situation, who sought temporary employment in neighbouring locations, 
were generally paid in kind, e.g., maize. 
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hold initially refused to consider urban unemployment for some 
of its members even though net returns (Yr) would have exceeded 
average net returns in acceptable activity. Then clearly, total 
net income would be increased by dispatching certain members to 
seek employment in urban centres. Since this requires abandonment 
of strongly held views, it is likely to be resisted, and given 
the greater risk attached to the value of (Wr), the implementation 
of this strategy would be all the more difficult. Nonetheless, 
for many peasant households rural out-migration has become necessary. 
Figure 1 provides a more formal presentation of the 
allocation of household labour between local activities and 
external places of employment.* The horizontal axis in Figure 1 
* 
For an extended discussion o a micro-level migration decision-
making model see Henry Rempel, Rural-Urban labour Migration and 
Urban Unemployment in Kenya (Laxenburg: International Institute 
or Applied systems Analysis, 1981.)* pp.. 2 - 20. 
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measures the number of adult-equivalent members of the household 
labour force. Household aspirations (measured as Y/A on the right 
^ ^ « . 
axis) is shown by YY and is to be interpreted as the level of 
income per household adult-equivalent required to meet the goals 
and aspirations of the total household. As we are not able to 
distinguish differences in aspirations among the units oi labour 
A A > 
inputs, YY is shown as a horizontal line. Its position will 
change every time the amount of income per adult-equiyalent needed 
to meet household aspirations changes. The line PP plots the 
average productivity of household labour. Assuming diminishing 
returns are experienced at the .margin, the line PP slopes down 
to the rights Since family income is shared according to tradition 
in a peasant-type household, the average rather than the marginal 
product of labour is relevant for measuring the supply of labour 
available for use outside of the community (Gugler, 1975). 
In general, an increase in (Y) caused by better trans-
port to facilitate selling output and bringing in purchased inputs, 
labour augmenting technical change, acquisition of more land or 
a favourable shift in either household output or input prices will 
shift PP to the right. A downward movement in (Y), caused by 
any o: these forces or by an increase in (E), would have the 
opposite effect. 
Pigure 1 shows the most general case. The proportion ox 
household labour seeking employment or employed outside of the 
local community will depend on the intersection of PP " and YY"* 
One extreme would be the situation where local opportunities were 
significantly favourable to generate a PP** completely above YY" . 
In that case, no out-.raigration would occur. An alternative 
extreme, caused by severe;land shortages, natural disaster or 
armed conflict, would generate .a PP which is completely b el oft YY. 
Such a situation would leave the household little choice other 
than a .move of. all of its ;,members in a desperate search for some 
alternative means oi income. Such migration is evident in the 
Sahel, Ethiopia and Sudan and accounts in part for the large 
number of refugees located in various parts of Africa. 
* The left, vertical axis of figure 1 is broken at the bottom 
because of difficulties involved in specifying the output of the 
marginal unit of labour. If labour productivity is defined by the 
labour inputs required over an agricultural cycle, then zero 
marginal productivity of labour is not considered applicable in 
most rural area. 
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Seasonal .migration, provided such opportunities exist, 
has the dual advantage of leaving family members within the home 
social network v/hile supplementing household income with outside 
earnings during a temporary absence. The actual value of maintaining 
these larger social networks is difficult to evaluate because 
seasonal migration also provides the economic advantages of enabling 
the household to .maintain most of its local production and of 
avoiding maintenance costs for the household in the destination 
area. 
If the household chooses to dispatch a member on a longer 
term basis to employment opportunities outside of the home area, 
the resulting relationship is bound to take the form of one family 
UQintaining two places of operation as identified by Weisner (1972) 
for Kenya. Initially the migrant will be assisted by the members 
remaining behind a n (V o r relatives and community members who have 
preceded the migrant. When the migrant has become established 
the household will benefit from remittances or periodic gifts plus, ' 
on the migrant's return, what she/he has been able to accumulate. 
The larger social network has facilitated the .move; the same net-
work is the beneficiary of the results generated by the .move. 
Should the move prove unsuccessful, -the .migrant can fall back on 
the household which shares the cost of the venture. 
The return to the household from such out-migration is 
dependent in large part on the type of migration the household can 
afford. The available evidence indicates remittances are most 
evident in international migration, less so for rural-urban migra-
tion, and least evident in rural-to-rural migration (Rempel and 
Lobdel, 197G). The costs involved in financing international 
migration typically are substantial, and if. household members have 
only limited employment qualifications with which to compete' for 
available formal sector jobs, in the towns, then a household may 
have to be satisfied with sending one or more family .members to 
some alternative rural area. 
/ 
The observed rural-to-urban migration tends to reflect 
previous migration by others from an area to a particular destina-
tion, who provide contacts and can serve to reduce significantly 
the costs of job search, and hence of migration (Rempel, 1981; 
63, 68 and Ch. 7; lehmann, 1982 : 140 - 141). As a result, 
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out-migration is more likely to be considered as an option in 
household labour allocation if the village already has established 
a "beachhead" elsewhere than will be the case if out-migra-tion 
from the area is a new phenomenon. Also, the extent of contact 
between migration source and destination areas in the form of 
trade, and as facilitated by good transport links, will induce 
out-migration in that awareness of the alternative will reduce the 
cost of the move and may stimulate aspirations and hence raise 
the household's (Y). 
Finally, the out-migration observed is quite nelective 
among household .members. Positive selection factors include the 
younger members, who are less likely to be tied down with family 
responsibilities and who can expect to obtain a larger life-time 
return f rom migration than older members, and the better educated, 
who may have above overage aspirations ond who are more likely to 
succeed in obtaining urban employment. A negative selection 
factor is between the sexes. The social structure that has evolved 
in many rural areas in Africa has men exercising control over women, 
to whom has been relegated primary responsibility for all aspects 
of household reproduction, including production and preparation 
of the staple food crops, storing food supplies between harvests, 
and maintaining a stock of seeds (Meillassoux, 1973). With this 
primary rural responsibility placed on women, men are much more likely 
to move to towns than women. 
Summarising the above discussion, these various strate-
gies whether pursued singly or in combination are not necessarily 
sufficient to close the gap between (Y) and (Y). It is even 
possible that the pursuit of these strategies will increase that 
gap. A strategy of self-exploitation, for example, may entail an 
increase in (c) in order to sustain labour productivity; hence, 
the gap may be widened. The re-allocation of labour may involve 
additional non-labour costs and may act to raise household aspira-
tions. This is especially noticable if the re-allocation involves 
out-emigration or the formal schooling of household members. The 
point here is simple: these adjustment strategies cannot assure 
the attainment of .some equilibrium state in which (Y = Y) and indeed 
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nay result in divergence iron that equilibrium because the level 
of (Y) is affected by the struggle to obtain the desired equality 
between output and aspiration levels. 
III. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OP THE MODEL FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
The core of any rural development strategy is the 
development of agriculture. Agriculture, as a sector, is expected 
to carry out a variety of national functions: l) provide a growing 
supply of food and raw materials for the economyj 2) provide a 
growing supply of labour for non-agricultural activities; 3) 
provide a growing market for industrial output; 4) serve as a primary 
source of savings; and 5) generate foreign exchange. 
For peasant agriculture in Africa, function 4) is of 
primary importance, with function 5) playing a secondary role.. 
As the bulk of the population is rural, function l), peasants 
providing food for themselves, has been taken for granted. During 
the colonial period various coercive measures v/ere necessary to 
assure even the limited supply of labour required. In contem-
porary Africa the role has been reversed, peasant agriculture is 
expected to 'hold' and feed the reserve army of potential 
employees until they might be needed in the formal sector 
(Meillassoux, 1973s 89 - 90; Hill, 1978: 26). Function 3) has 
remained largely ignored in Africa. 
To expand the capacity of peasant agriculture to provide 
savings and foreign exchange, public policy has been pre-occupied 
with supposed supply constraints to expanded agricultural out-put. 
This is not surprising, given that peasants were valued primarily 
for the surplus that could be extracted • from their productive 
efforts. 
With the emerging contemporary interest in peasants as 
a means of .meeting Africa's growing food problem, some attention 
is being directed to the demand side of agricultural production. 
One source of this attention is the international creditors; 
the growing food imports are a threat to the ability of countries 
in Africa to service their respective debts. Similarly, the 
developed country importers of agricultural goods are becoming 
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concerned that a food crisis within African countries will 
threaten their sources of low cost agricultural commodities.* 
Such international concerns are now generating consider-
able pressure for significant macro-level reforms within African 
countries. Common components of such macro-reforms are; l) remove 
domestic price controls on food; 2) reduce the level of taxation on 
agriculture, both explicit (excise taxes) and implicit (e.g., 
over-valued exchange rates); 3) reduce or eliminate the role of 
the state in the. agricultural distribution system; and 4) reduce 
the extent of effective tariff protection in various parts of. the 
industrial sector. This advice is premised on models of behaviour 
for commercial farmers; these are the only i'armers known to deve-
loped country advisors. 
The successful implementation of this policy package 
would serve the interests of the international community: both 
creditors and importers. It would also threaten the existing 
political structures throughout much of Africa. The nature of such 
a threat would include: l) the ability to extract surplus from 
peasants would be eroded; 2) the cost of 'holding' the reserve 
army of potential employees would increase; 3) the wage costs of 
production would increase; and 4) the ability of peasants to 
challenge the political system would increase. 
In the past the power of the peasants has been limited 
primarily to their ability to withdraw from the market (Shanin 
1971: 254; Hill, 1978: 26 - 27).** To counter this power of 
peasants, Hill argues that African states invested large sums of 
money-in agricultural schemes (Hill, 1978). In many countries 
such schemes took the form of state farms; in the Ivory Coast and 
Kenya it took the form of loans and investment incentives which 
enabled individual members of the "public-sector bourgeoisie" to 
purchase land. The political effect of these different approaches 
has been similar. The generalised price increases for farm output 
promoted by external sources would not solve the inefficiencies 
* • In , 
Even though Sub-Saharan E'Africa has a food crisis, as identified 
in the opening paragraphs of this paper, it is a net exporter of food (excluding food aid). World Pood Council, 1983: 6). 
* * 
At times of national crisis, to assure peasant support, governments 
hove been known to carry out some agrarian reform, making more land 
available for use by the peasants. 
- 23 - IDS/'WP 422 
connon to these agricultural schemes, but would strengthen the 
peasant farmers. The result could be a serious challenge to the 
existing class interests of politicians and top-level government 
administrators. 
Rather than open a political 'Pandora's box' with a 
shotgun approach to Africa's food crisis, a preferred approach 
would be a set of specific policies that can be implemented within 
the current political systems, will serve to provide greater food 
security, and will build on the strengths of the peasant household 
system while encouraging and enabling it to becone .more productive. 
A starting point is price policy. Por peasant farmers, 
as a means of .minimising risk, price security is of prime importance. 
Price security includes; a <1 clear indication of what price will 
be paid, a definite commitment that the announced price will be 
paid in full at delivery, and an assurance that market delivery of 
farm output will be possible. Should the government desire to 
affect planting as well as marketing decisions, the relative prices 
of the various farm outputs need to.be announced before planting 
decisions are made. 
Such a price policy places some risk on the government as 
it vail need to absorb all output placed on the market. Under 
current marketing systems, when excess production occurs, governments 
have been known to not pay the full amount, to delay payment, or 
to simply reject part of the farm output delivered, and thus 
force the cost of excess production back on to the peasant farmers, 
A possible, longer-term solution would be a regional food agreement 
among African countries, where temporary surpluses could be moved 
to couiitries in need and where staple foods could be obtained 
whenever Shortages occur, either- because of drought or because the 
announced price was too low. 
Within any one country, a means to reducing the costs of 
a food security program, yet addressing the needs of those groups 
at greatest risk, would entail limiting price controls to the staple 
foods of the low income groups in society. Similarly increasing 
the producer price of such staples, relative to the price of other 
farm outputs, will increase the supply of low~inco.mo staple foods. 
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Re-directing research resources and extension services toward such 
staples would serve to increase the yield per hectare and reduce 
the gap between the producer price and the consumer price. 
This approach to food security could serve to draw in 
the smaller, poorer peasant farmers as it would minimise their 
risk of producing for the .market and would open the possibility of 
increasing their productivity. Given that wo,men take primary res-
ponsibility for these staple food crops, the research needs to 
grow out of their experience and the extension services need to be 
directed toward wo.men. The research and extension should cover 
the storage and preparation as well as the production of these 
staple foods. 
The need to develop appropriate technology is a general 
problem in Africa. Given the high degree of dependency on external 
sources of new products and technology, the indigenous capacity 
to invent and innovate is very shallow. Internally, the economies 
are characterised by a high degree of dualism, which limits the 
potential for backward and forward linkages between the agricul-
tural and the industrial sectors. Finally, given the strong 
desire to minimise risk, peasants show a distinct hesitancy to 
adopt any technology which .may increase the variation in the 
quantity of output, create a dependency on externally supplied 
inputs, or interfere with the production of a basic supply of 
staple food crops. 
The industrial capacity to address the emerging technology 
needs of small farmers opens up the possibility of realising the 
development success achieved in Denmark, Japan and Taiwan. To 
develop-, such capacity several policy options will need to be 
considered: l) a selective de-linking fro.m those transnational 
corporations that keep injecting inappropriate products > "tech-
nology; 2) an active land tenure policy which facilitates the 
ability of peasant farmers to develop their land yet effectively 
con's trains the establishment of either largo state or private 
farms that rely on imported inputs and substitute scarce capital 
for abundant labour; 3) eliminate all explicit and implicit 
subsidies for imported farm .machinery or for capital intensive 
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technology; 4) develop the research ond learning capacities 
needed to invent and implement indigenous technology; and 5) actively 
work to spread proven technology among peasant farmers.* Estab-
lishing mechanisms of vertical integration can reduce the risks 
to individual farmers of adopting new technology or of specialising 
somewhat on a particular cash crop (Kerblay, 1971: 158 - 159; 
Bernstein, 1979: 429 - 430). 
A final, more general policy thrust would be the ..provision 
of rural infrastructure. Such expenditures have taken on a variety 
of forms, including educational and health facilities, improved 
eommunlea t lo n e ©nd transport systems, public•housing *nd the 
provltibn"!-^ f •2vet3ft'e»tional facilities. The objectives of such a strategy to lay the foundation for improved rural productivity ond to encourage the growth of intra-rural sectoral linkages. 
In so far as public expenditures directly employ house-
hold labour and to the extent that average net returns from such 
employment exceed returns from alternative employment, then total 
income will increase for the affected household. Moreover, if 
rural public expenditures create new markets for rural output, 
then average net returns to labour in a wide variety of occupations 
will increase somewhat. 
At the same time, such public expenditures may act to 
increase the household's minimum socially acceptable level of 
consumption as new goods and services are now perceived to be both 
necessai-y and available. Of course, this need not necessarily be 
disadvantageous so long as the household is able to meet its 
higher aspirations through a reallocation of its productive 
resources, especially labour. If, however, this newly created (or 
enhanced) income gap cannot be clossed, then households may feel 
disenchanted and resentful, and as a result may be "forced" to 
choose out-migration in an effort to remedy their situation. 
The above set of policies may be difficult to implement in 
that peasants tend to distrust government initiatives. A long 
Shapiro (1983) reports substantial productivity differences among 
cotton farmers in the Geita district of Tanzania. It is possible 
such differences primarily reflect differences among farmers in 
their ability to bear risk, and hence differences in the relative 
priority they give to working on their staple food crops versus 
cotton. 
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history of being subjected to surplus extraction, with limited 
government services in return, causes peasants to question the 
intent of any policy action. One approach to overcoming this 
distrust would be to decentralise both tax collection and deci-
sions on government expenditures. In this way peasants would have 
the opportunity to make some input into how public money is spent 
and they would be able to seek the benefits available to them 
from the taxes they have paid. 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The underlying premise of this paper may be stated 
simply: rural household decision-making among African peasants is 
a rational process in which complex objectives nre pursued within 
a set of constraints. The model attempts to describe one aspect of 
such dicision-making, namely the allocation of labour by peasant-
type rural households whose behaviour characteristics differ 
fundamentally from those of profit .maximising commercial entre-
preneurs. 
It is expected that the application of this .model to various 
aspects of rural development will yield a set of hypotheses at 
least some of which are not derived from alternative analytical 
frameworks. A correct understanding of rural development prob-
lems, and hence an ability to formulate overall development policy, 
necessarily requires a realistic model of rural household decision-
making. We believe that the present model is a step in that 
direction. 
- z i -
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